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Abstract
This paper investigates whether product market competition acts as an external mechanism for disciplining management and also whether there
is any relationship between the degree of competition a firm faces and its corporate governance. We find that firms in competitive industries or with
low market power tend to have weak corporate governance structures. Results are robust to various competition measures at firm and industry levels,
even after controlling for firm-specific variables. We further find that corporate governance quality has a significant effect on performance only
when product market competition is weak. The overall evidence suggests that product market competition has a substantial impact on corporate
governance and that it substitutes for corporate governance quality. Finally, we provide evidence that the disciplinary force of competition on
management is from the fear of liquidation.
© 2011 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
JEL classiﬁcation: G18; G34
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1. Introduction
Since Berle and Means (1932) publish their seminal work
on the separation of ownership and control, numerous theoret-
ical and empirical works have focused on the role of corporate
governance systems in mitigating the agency problems between
shareholders and managers. However, existing evidence has
shown that conventional corporate governance mechanisms do
not work very effectively.4 Even with the lack of effective corpo-
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corporate performances.
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rate governance systems, many firms still operate efficiently and
compete effectively in global markets. Some non-profit orga-
nizations in competitive industries are good examples. They
typically have no outside shareholders and a smaller proportion
of independent directors and, as generally argued, such gov-
ernance structures tend to have lower monitoring capabilities.
While these governance structures are typically prevalent among
non-profit organizations, they have little impact on their oper-
ational efficiency and corporate performance. Allen and Gale’s
(2000) theoretical arguments suggest that standard governance
mechanisms are less crucial for firms that operate in chang-
ing product market environments. The purpose of our current
study is to address this issue – whether a firm’s product mar-
ket environment acts as an external mechanism for disciplining
management and ensuring corporate performance.
Theoretical models have argued that competition in product
markets is a powerful force for overcoming the agency problem
between shareholders and managers.5 Tough product market
competition forces management to improve financial perfor-
mance and to make the best decisions for the future, because
failure to do so would possibly result in bankruptcy and job loss.
Recently, Allen and Gale (2000) formalize a model to show that
competition in product markets plays the role of takeovers. Well-
managed firms take over the market from poorly managed firms.
5 See, for example, Alchian (1950), Hart (1983), Scharfstein (1988), Schmidt
(1997), and Stigler (1958).
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Competition helps reveal the best management team and disci-
pline management.6 In Allen and Gale’s model, competition
acts as a substitute for external governance mechanisms, partic-
ularly the market for corporate control. Their model gives rise to
several testable implications that prompt our current study. We
investigate whether and how the nature of product market com-
petition acts as an external disciplinary mechanism for corporate
management. We also examine whether corporate governance
mechanisms matter for firms that operate in a dynamic compet-
itive product market environment. Specifically, we test whether
the fear of liquidation is the channel through which the compe-
tition uses to reduce managerial slack and ensure the quality of
management.
For our analyses, we employ the G- and E-index proposed by
Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2009), respectively, as
proxies for the quality of corporate governance. Furthermore, we
employ the Herfindahl index (H-index) at the industry level and
industry adjusted price-cost margins (IPCM) at the firm level as
measures of product market competition. The H-index indicates
the degree of concentration for an industry, while IPCM gauges
the ability of a firm to price over the cost and the dominance
of firms within industries. If a firm faces stronger competition
from other firms within the same industry, the ability for this
firm to price over the cost is smaller. The smaller value of IPCM
implies that a firm has a weaker market power or faces stronger
competition from the product market. IPCM is also a good proxy
for the fear of liquidation because firms with low market power
have a higher probability to be liquidated. Similarly, a smaller
H-index demonstrates that there are many competitive firms in
an industry.
Our study finds evidence consistent with the theoretical
prediction that competition acts as a substitute for corporate
governance mechanisms. Firms in highly competitive indus-
tries tend to have significantly weaker corporate governance
than firms in concentrated industries. Firms with low values of
IPCM are inclined to have poor-quality corporate governance
structures. Taken together, both analyses at the industry and
firm levels suggest that the quality of corporate governance is
not important as long as competition is strong. As theoretically
implied, competition has a disciplinary effect on management,
suggesting that the force of discipline is from the fear of liqui-
dation since loser firms (firms with low market power or low
IPCM) are likely to be driven out of business.
Our results are robust even after controlling for size, firm
value, trading volume, return on assets, stock returns, dividend
yields, and institutional ownership. Existing studies have shown
that firm value and corporate governance are simultaneously
determined; we apply three-stage least squares regressions with
instrumental variables for governance index and firm value to
again test the relationship between competition and governance
(e.g., Palia, 2001; Brick et al., 2005). Our main finding that
strong competition is associated with weak governance struc-
tures is robust across the industry and firm level analyses. When
6 Throughout the paper, we use the general term “competition¨to describe
product market competition.
we substitute past firm value for current firm value to mitigate the
problem of endogeneity, the findings remain similar. Therefore,
the effect of competition on the quality of corporate governance
is not caused by low firm value or poor operating performance.
Competition does have an impact on corporate governance.
Finally, we show that corporate governance quality has a sig-
nificant effect on performance only when competition is weak.
Competition alone, to some extent, may be sufficient to disci-
pline management. When competition is strong, well-governed
firms do not earn higher abnormal returns than poorly governed
firms. However, good firms do perform better than bad firms in
weak-competition portfolios. Therefore, the quality of corpo-
rate governance does not add value to firm performance when
competition is sufficiently strong to discipline management. Our
findings not only demonstrate that the agency problem may not
be as serious as the previous literature has suggested, but they
also underline the importance of product market competition.
The overall evidence suggests that competition plays a substitute
role in corporate governance mechanisms.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in three ways.
First, we provide empirical evidence in support of related
theories that the influence of product market competition on
corporate governance does exist. While competition is widely
regarded as a good thing, there is little knowledge about the
connection between competition and corporate governance.
Hermalin (1992) uses a theoretical model to show that an
increase in the shareholders’ bargaining power can reduce
agency problems and make managers more sensitive to com-
petition. His argument suggests that competition complements
corporate governance. Padilla (2000) also comments that corpo-
rate governance remains important even if competition plays a
role in corporate governance. However, Karuna (2007) demon-
strates that firms in competitive industries have a better quality
of corporate governance because of the fact that these firms have
more power and need to be monitored. Our work differs from
most of the previous studies in that we treat competition as a cor-
porate governance mechanism to examine the direct relationship
between competition and corporate governance.
Second, we investigate how product market competition
affects corporate governance and the channel which competi-
tion acts as a disciplinary tool. Guadalupe and Pérez-González
(2010) find that strong competition reduces private benefits
of control. They attribute the effect of competition to both
the improvement of information transparency for firms in the
same industry and the fear of bankruptcy. However, as dis-
cussed earlier, information available in the market reveals the
best management and that the fear of losing market share com-
pels management to work hard. This, therefore, motivates us
to explore whether the information improvement or fear of
bankruptcy is the major force that disciplines management.
Cremers et al. (2008) also find that firms in competitive indus-
tries have poor governance quality, and they ascribe this finding
to customer relationships. Our study, however, determines the
potential driving forces behind the competition on corporate
governance.
Third, we contribute to the policy debate about corporate
governance. Prior studies generally investigate the problem of
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corporate governance from internal governance structures of
a firm. For example, they mainly focus on board structures,
executive compensation, and shareholder rights. Since internal
governance and management systems are integrated, to some
extent, managers have power to control or maneuver gover-
nance structures to entrench themselves or gain private benefits.
Therefore, some researchers provide a solution to the problem
of corporate governance through lawmaking. They argue that
a well-designed law can improve corporate governance. Com-
petition may be a solution. Unlike conventional governance
mechanisms, competition is an exogenous factor and provides
an effective market monitoring mechanism. Our evidence sug-
gests that competition generates a strong incentive for managers
to work diligently.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes data and
sample selection. Section 4 examines the relationship between
corporate governance and product market competition, while
Section 5 looks at how corporate governance interacts with
product market competition. Section 6 concludes.
2. Theoretical and existing evidence
2.1. Theoretical considerations
How does product market competition affect the quality of
corporate governance? Allen and Gale (2000) argue that com-
petition can be an option for corporate governance; competition
can substitute for corporate governance mechanisms directly.
Japanese companies are the most impressive examples that illus-
trate how intense competition produces successful companies,
such as Toyota and Honda. The boards of directors in these
Japanese companies are at least three times larger than simi-
lar companies in the United States and United Kingdom and
have a small ratio of independent directors. Takeovers also
rarely happen in the Japanese market (e.g. see Allen and Gale,
2000). Conventional wisdom is that these characteristics cannot
be classified as good governance practices, because Japanese
companies lack supervisory mechanisms from their boards of
directors and from the market for corporate control. However, in
reality, Japanese companies are successful and profitable. Their
products are the symbols of higher quality, cheaper prices, and
better designs. Most consumers favor Japanese products and
place them at the top of their shopping list. These are some
examples suggesting that quality corporate governance is not
a necessary component for strong performance. In other words,
product market competition can provide an effective monitoring
of management and is an alternative form of corporate gover-
nance mechanisms.
Another example that Allen and Gale (2000) raise to rein-
force their points is those non-profit organizations with weak
boards that can compete with, or even beat, for-profit corpora-
tions. The successful story of the Internet browser, Firefox, is
a case in point. Firefox’s parent company, Mozilla, is a public
benefit organization, which internationally unites many enthusi-
astic programmers to develop open source code applications for
public use. The market share of Firefox climbed from 4.22% in
January 2005 to 13.38% in March 2007. Meanwhile, the market
share of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer dropped from 85.97% in
January 2005 to 70.52% in March 2007 (see survey from Janco
Associates Inc., 2007). Mozilla has no outside shareholders and
only four people on its board of directors. This implies again
that good governance practices do not necessarily guarantee
better performance and competition alone can provide effective
monitoring of management.
The triumphant stories of Japanese companies and non-profit
organizations suggest that product market competition induces
managers to work hard. In their theoretical model, Allen and
Gale (2000) argue that product market competition is used to
select the best management team and to eliminate firms with
bad management. They presume that successful companies are
able to control a large product market share, making it difficult
for loser companies to compete. Thus, competition acts like a
takeover, but firms take over the product market instead of other
firms. If the management does not work diligently, their compa-
nies will lose market shares and managers will eventually have
no job security. Thus, the fear of liquidation compels managers
to put forth their best efforts for their firms.
Allen and Gale (2000) assume that there are n firms in the
market and that they choose the investment strategy k = k1, . . .,
kn at date 0 to develop products. At this time, no one, including
both investors and managements, knows the state of nature w
and the value of product V until date 1. The value of the product
depends on both the amount of capital invested in the project
and the quality of management. At date 1, the state of nature w
and value of product V for the firms are realized,
V (k,w) = (V1(k1, w), . . . , Vn(kn,w)).
In order to capture the whole product market, the firm with the
first-best product will try to force the products of other firms to
be of no value for consumers. The strategy is that the best firm
will price its product to be equal to the difference between the
values of the first- and second-best products such that the price
of the second-best product will be exactly zero. If the second-
best firm sets the price higher than zero for its product, no one
will want to buy its product. The price of other inferior products
in the market will be zero too. For any firm i, let
V−i(k−i, w) = (V1(k1, w), . . . , Vi−1(ki−1, w),
Vi+1(ki+1, w), . . . , Vn(kn,w))
denote the vector of product values where j /= i; let
k−i = (k1, . . . , ki−1, ki+1, . . . , kn)
denote the vector of investments where j /= i; and let
V ∗−i(k−i, w) = max{Vj(kj, w)}
denote the highest product value in the vector of V−i(k−i, w).
As a result, the price pi(k,w) for the product of firm i should be
set to
pi(k,w) = max{Vi(k,w) − V ∗−i(k−i, w), 0)}, ∀i.
In this way, only the winner firm with the first-best product can
make a profit and survive. Other firms in the same industry will
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be withdrawn from the market, because the marginal cost of
these loser firms is greater than its marginal benefit. Since an
inferior product indicates an insufficient investment or a worse
management, if loser firms want to continue their business and
recover the loss at date 1, these firms have to invest more k at
data 1 which will reflect on the increase of the R&D ratio or to
enhance the management. This allows them to produce higher
quality products and to be able to compete again with the winner
firm at the next stage, for example date 2.
As discussed earlier, competition helps reveal good manage-
ment teams and can discipline those with poor performance.
Since the purpose of corporate governance is to ensure the man-
agement quality, competition provides almost the same function
as corporate governance does. Therefore, competition can be
considered as an efficient governance mechanism and can act as
a substitute for traditional corporate governance structures. Our
hypotheses are as follows:
H1. The source of disciplining management for product market
competition comes from the fear of liquidation.
H2. Firms in competitive industries or with low market power
have weaker corporate governance structures.
H3. Competitive industries and firms with lower market power
have higher R&D ratios.
Allen and Gale (2000) further suggest that the importance
of agency cost is over-emphasized. Executives in the United
States put tremendous efforts into their jobs. In fact, they act
like entrepreneurs. Managers always try their best to identify
investment opportunities and to develop good products in order
to make their companies grow, even though there are some
conflict of interests between shareholders and management.
Shareholders may not know better than their management about
the industry and product market. If competition can be a gov-
ernance mechanism, the quality of corporate governance is less
important as long as the product market is competitive.
Padilla (2000), however, points out that competition may not
be the one and only solution to solve the problem of misman-
agement, implying that better governance structures still have
an effect on management, even under intense product market
competition. If competition cannot effectively substitute for cor-
porate governance, we expect that poorly governed firms would
still perform worse than well-governed firms, even though the
product market is competitive. We test the null hypotheses in
line with Allen and Gale’s (2000) argument that
H4. There is no significant difference in abnormal returns
between good and poor governance portfolios when the product
market competition is strong.
2.2. Related empirical literature
Although many researchers argue that competition can
improve performance and monitor management, there are not
many papers providing empirical evidence to show that such
direct effects exist. Nickell (1996) demonstrates that product
market competition improves productivity growth, while Hou
and Robinson (2006) show that competitive industries earn
higher returns, compared to concentrated industries. Johnson
et al. (2009) find that the distribution of shareholder rights differs
from industry to industry, with some industries having stronger
rights than others. After controlling for industry effects, firms
with stronger shareholder rights earn no abnormal returns than
firms with weaker rights. The results are still consistent when the
entrenchment index from Bebchuk et al. (2009) is used to mea-
sure the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, industry
characteristics do matter for the quality of corporate governance.
Karuna (2007) measures competition at the industry level and
finds that firms in competitive industries have better corporate
governance structures. He argues that managers in competitive
industries have discretionary powers over deciding the effective
strategies for the company. Therefore, these managers have to be
well monitored. However, Cremers et al. (2008) find that firms
in competitive industries have weaker shareholder rights, and
they contend that the industry effect on corporate governance is
caused by long-term customer relationships. If service providers
are taken over by another firm, customers often suffer from
switching service providers. This is especially evident in com-
petitive industries in which firms have long-term relationships
with their customers. Thus, these firms increase shareholder pro-
visions that restrict shareholder rights to alleviate customers’
survival concern. While these two studies are closely related to
our work, we examine whether and how competition influences
corporate governance and particularly, we explore how compe-
tition interacts with firm value and performance to affect the
quality of governance structures.
A somewhat related study is by Guadalupe and Pérez-
González (2010) who provide indirect evidence that industry
characteristics affect the quality of corporate governance. Using
publicly traded data in 19 countries, their study shows that
the higher degree of competition is associated with the lower
degree of private benefits of control. Thus, when a domestic
industry faces strong competition from the international mar-
ket, managers and owners in the industry receive fewer private
benefits from controlling their companies. The reduced bene-
fits are generally considered as a signal of good governance
structures in corporate governance-related literature. The evi-
dence implies that competition improves corporate governance.
Furthermore, Guadalupe and Pérez-González conclude that the
effect of competition on corporate governance comes from both
the improvement of information transparency for firms in the
same industry and the fear of bankruptcy among top executives.
These are two major explanations offered in previous litera-
ture as to how product market competition affects corporate
governance. However, no study to date provides convincing evi-
dence that explains which of these two theories most accurately
describes the effect of competition on management.
Our work relates to studies that link product market competi-
tion to corporate governance. We test the empirical implication
of Allen and Gale’s (2000) theoretical model that competition
serves as an external mechanism to discipline management.
We show evidence that competition can substitute for corpo-
rate governance, and that the effect of competition on corporate
governance possibly stems from the fear of losing market share.
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Although product market competition, firm value, and firm per-
formance individually affect corporate governance, we show that
neither firm value nor firm performance is able to completely
subsume the effect of competition on corporate governance. The
implication is that the impact of competition on corporate gov-
ernance is not driven by firm value or firm performance. We find
that good-quality corporate governance does not add value to
companies when they face intense competition from the product
market.
3. Data and sample construction
Our sample comes from three key data sources: (i) corporate
governance rating information from the 2006 publications of
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) and from
Bebchuk’s website; (ii) accounting information from the COM-
PUSTAT industrial annual file; and (iii) returns data from the
CRSP monthly file. The sample consists of all NYSE-, AMEX-,
and NASDAQ-listed stocks that have complete information from
the three data sources for the period of 1990–2005.
3.1. Measures of product market competition
We employ two different approaches to measure product mar-
ket competition. The first measure is the Herfindahl index of
concentration (H-index) that measures the degree of competi-
tion among firms in an industry. Holmström (1999) and Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983) contend that if the number of competitors in
a market increases, and if the shocks affecting each firm’s costs
are correlated, then an increase in competition would generate
additional information that can be used to mitigate moral hazard
problems. Increased competition as well as greater probability
of liquidation of firms can be used to discipline management
(Schmidt (1997)). In both cases, the Herfindahl index measures
product market competition at the industry level. If there are
more firms belonging to the same industry with each firm having
a small market share, this industry is said to have a strong prod-
uct market competition. A smaller Herfindahl index implies the
existence of many competitive firms in an industry, and a larger
Herfindahl index suggests that only a few, primarily large, firms
in an industry that dominate the market.
The Herfindahl (H) index is defined as
H-indexi =
J∑
j=1
s2ij,
where sij is the market share of firm j in industry i. For each year,
market share is calculated by using a firm’s net sales divided by
total sales in its industry. In order to reduce possible errors in
the data, we apply this calculation to each industry for each year
and average the values of past three years to find the H-index
for an industry at the industry level analysis. Then, a firm is
assigned the H-index of its industry to determine the intensity
of its product market competition at the firm level analysis if
the H-index is the measure of competition. Following Hou and
Robinson (2006), we categorize industries using three-digit level
SIC codes because this balances two problems associated with
an industry classification. First, unrelated firms are not grouped
together. Second, we have enough firms within each industry.
Our sample contains 357 non-regulated industries.7 There
are several reasons for excluding firms from regulated indus-
tries. One, managers in regulated industries have less incentive
to perform better because of a ratchet effect. Since outside reg-
ulators determine product price or profit, managers of regulated
firms would be inclined to put forth less effort. Hence, these reg-
ulated firms face different corporate governance requirements
from investors (Meyer and Vickers, 1997). Two, regulated firms
may have low operating costs and specific capital structures
compared with their counterparts from other industries.
The second measure of competition is an industry-adjusted
price-cost margin (IPCM). This measure is based on the con-
cept of the Lerner index. This index is widely employed in the
economic literature to measure a firm’s ability to price above
its marginal cost and therefore capture its pricing power. A firm
with little or no pricing power would face strong competition
from the product market and might have a greater likelihood of
going into bankruptcy. A related firm with strong pricing power,
on the other hand, would experience little competition. A num-
ber of empirical studies implement the Lerner index or a similar
methodology to measure a firm’s fear of bankruptcy or product
market competition (see, for example, Nickell, 1996; Funk and
Wanzenried, 2003; Gaspar and Massa, 2006). Thus, IPCM is
a good proxy for product market competition at the firm level.
The lower a firm’s IPCM, the higher is its degree of competition
from the product market.
A firm’s price-cost margin (PCM) is defined as
PCMi = profitit
salesit
,
where profit is calculated as sales minus the sum of the cost
of goods sold and selling, general and administrative expenses.
If there is any missing value, the operating income is used to
measure profit. A firm’s IPCM is then determined by subtracting
the industry average PCM from its PCM, where industries are
based on a 3-digit SIC classification.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our sample. Panel A of
the table shows the distribution of the two competition measures:
the H-index and IPCM. The H-index varies from 0.01 to 1, with
a mean of 0.55, and the IPCM is between −464.3 and 93.46
with a mean of 1.64. There are some extreme outliers for the
distribution of IPCMs, so we use two methods to mitigate this
problem. One, we average the IPCM values of the past three
years (IPCM-3YR). Two, we winsorize PCMs at 1% and 5%
levels to calculate the value of IPCM for each firm (IPCM-1%
and IPCM-5%). The resulting means for IPCM-3YR, IPCM-
1%, and IPCM-5% are 1.38, 0.33, and 0.10, respectively. It is
interesting to note that there is almost no correlation between
the IPCM and H-index at the firm level, suggesting that firms
7 As suggested in Barclay and Smith (1995), regulated industries include
railroads (SIC 4011), trucking (SIC 4210–4813), airline (SIC 5412), telecommu-
nications (SIC 4812 and 4813), and gas and electric utilities (SIC 4900–4939).
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Mean SD 25% Median 75% Correlation
IPCM
H-index 3YR 1% 5%
Panel A: Product market competition measures
H-index 0.55 0.34 0.26 0.48 0.86 1.00
IPCM 3-YR 1.38 6.86 0.00 0.09 0.70 −0.06 1.00
IPCM 1% 0.33 1.10 0.00 0.09 0.41 −0.08 0.57 1.00
IPCM 5% 0.10 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.17 −0.09 0.37 0.72 1.00
Rank Index Size Asset Sales ROA Q R&D IO YLD
Panel B: Characteristics of competition-formed portfolios
H-index formed portfolios
Low 0.20 1447.02 2493.75 1506.70 0.07 1.82 0.34 0.35 0.02
2 0.49 1482.97 3719.59 1351.04 0.09 1.84 0.12 0.34 0.02
High 0.96 1368.28 2633.09 1399.34 0.08 2.12 0.17 0.30 0.03
IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
Low −0.32 3350.27 9129.66 4201.96 0.10 1.38 0.17 0.54 0.02
2 0.13 5786.49 12353.26 4128.74 0.14 1.69 0.02 0.57 0.02
High 4.34 5847.29 6323.40 2609.40 0.13 2.28 0.13 0.57 0.01
IPCM-1% formed portfolios
Low −0.15 3415.77 10205.85 4252.85 0.09 1.38 0.21 0.54 0.02
2 0.11 5612.62 11501.86 3953.06 0.13 1.66 0.02 0.56 0.02
High 1.04 5954.81 6104.05 2733.23 0.14 2.30 0.09 0.58 0.01
IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Low −0.07 3165.69 9140.69 3987.23 0.08 1.41 0.25 0.53 0.02
2 0.07 5027.08 10777.44 3979.14 0.14 1.58 0.02 0.55 0.02
High 0.32 6780.66 7209.14 2969.81 0.16 2.35 0.06 0.60 0.01
Panel A of this table provides the distribution of two product market competition measures: the Herfindahl index (H-index) of industries and industry adjusted
price-cost margin (IPCM) of firms. The H-index is given by the sum of squared market shares of all firms in an industry. Market share is the ratio of a firm’s sales to
total sales in its industry. Price-cost margin is the ratio of profit to sales, where profit is sales less the sum of cost of good sold and selling, general and administrative
expenses. If there is any missing profit value, operating income is used instead. IPCM-3YR is the three-year-moving-average of IPCM for each firm. IPCM-1% and
IPCM-5% are PCMs winsorized at 1% and 5% levels. PCMs that are larger or lower than the boundaries are assigned to the values of 99(95)% or 1(5)% in the PCM
distribution. Industries are defined using three-digit SIC codes. The correlation between competition measures is calculated at the firm level by assigning a firm’s
industry H-index to the firm. Panel B shows average values of characteristics for industries and firms grouped based on two product market competition measures.
The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms that have complete information from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and information on IRRC governance ratings
for the period 1990–2005. Every year industries and firms are sorted into three groups according to either the H-index or IPCM. Size is the equity value in millions
of dollars. Asset and sales are the total assets and net sales. ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. Q is the ratio of market value
of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals book value of assets + market value of common stock – book value of common stock –
deferred taxes. R&D is the ratio of max(R&D expenditure,0) to total assets; IO is the total institutional ownership (in percent); and YLD is dividend yield which is
defined as the ratio of dividend to share price at fiscal year end. All variables are equal-weighted averages at the industry level when the H-index is the measure of
competition.
in competitive industries do not necessarily have a low pricing
power.
3.2. Governance ratings
We employ governance ratings as a proxy for the quality of
corporate governance. Such ratings are available from IRRC,
as well as Bebchuk’s website. The IRRC governance index (G-
index) takes into account 24 different provisions in 5 categories
– tactics for delaying hostile bidders, proxy voting rights, direc-
tor/officer protection, other takeover defenses, and state laws.
The G-index of a firm varies between 0 and 24, which is con-
structed by adding one point to every specific provision in place
and zero otherwise. As a result, the lower a firm’s G-index score,
the higher is the quality of its corporate governance.
Bebchuk et al. (2009) argue that not all 24 governance provi-
sions, which form the G-index, are detrimental to shareholders
or firm value. Some provisions are even positively correlated
with firm value or stock performance. Hence they construct the
E-index based on six provisions – staggered boards, limits to
shareholder bylaw amendments, supermajority requirements for
mergers, supermajority requirements for charter amendments,
poison pills, and golden parachutes. They give one point to the
presence of each provision and zero otherwise and then sum
all points up to form the E-index. Similar to the G-index, the
greater a firm’s E-index, the lower is the quality of its corporate
governance.
3.3. Control variables
Drawn from existing studies, we also control for several
variables that may have an impact on the quality of corpo-
rate governance. They are (a) Firm size, the market value of
equity in millions, (b) Institutional ownership, the fraction of
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shares owned by all 13F institutional investors, as of the pre-
vious calendar year-end, (c) Largest Shareholder, the fraction
of shares owned by the largest 13F institutional investors, as of
the previous calendar year-end, (d) Trading volume, the past 5-
year average monthly trading volume divided by the number of
shares outstanding, (e) Sales Growth, the average of sales growth
over past 5 years, (f) Past-5-year return, defined as the past 5-
year average monthly return before fiscal year-end, (g) Tobin’s
Q, the ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets,
where market value is calculated as the book value of assets
plus the market value of equity minus book value of common
stock and minus deferred taxes (balance sheet), (h) ROA, net
income divided by book value of assets and (i) Dividend Yield,
calculated as dividends divided by calendar year-end market
value. Accounting-based control variables are calculated using
the accounting information from the fiscal year ended before
June 30 of year t− 1.
Panel B in Table 1 shows the distribution of stock charac-
teristics for industries and firms grouped by their competition
measures at the industry level (H-index) and at the firm level
(IPCM). For each year t− 1, we sort industries and firms based
on the competition measures and divide them into three groups.
Results indicate that these measures do not necessarily sug-
gest that firms with a low H-index would share the same firm
characteristics as those with a low IPCM. For example, firms
in competitive industries (i.e., with low H-index) tend to have
larger market values and institutional ownership, but smaller
total assets and lower dividend yields. On the other hand, firms
with low market power (small IPCM) tend to have smaller mar-
ket values and institutional ownership, but have larger assets
and higher dividend yields. Firms with both low H-index and
IPCM have larger sales and R&D, but smaller ROA and Tobin’s
Q. A high R&D ratio for competitive industries and low IPCM
firms indicate that when firms face strong competition from the
product market, they will invest more capital to improve their
product quality or production efficiency.8 This is consistent with
our prediction that loser firms or firms facing strong competition
will invest more capital to develop products of better quality in
order to survive.
4. The role of product market competition
In this section, we study how a firm’s corporate governance
mechanism is related to competition. In particular, we explore
how product market competition interacts with firm value and
firm performance to affect the quality of corporate governance.
4.1. Competition and corporate governance
We first examine the direct link between product market
competition and corporate governance. To assess the effect of
competition on corporate governance, we split industries or firms
8 The differences of R&D ratio between portfolios with high and low compe-
tition measures, except based on IPCM-3YR, are all significant at conventional
levels.
Table 2
Impact of competition on corporate governance structures.
Measure Competition index Low-High
Low 2 High Mean t-Stat
Panel A: G-index
H-index 9.38 9.21 9.04 0.34 7.58**
IPCM-3YR 9.40 9.38 8.84 0.56 12.34**
IPCM-1% 9.38 9.40 8.85 0.53 12.34**
IPCM-5% 9.29 9.46 8.87 0.42 9.26**
Panel B: E-index
H-index 2.60 2.60 2.35 0.25 4.83**
IPCM-3YR 2.45 2.45 2.18 0.27 12.19**
IPCM-1% 2.44 2.46 2.18 0.26 11.77**
IPCM-5% 2.42 2.47 2.19 0.23 10.57**
This table reports the equal-weighted average G- and E-index of portfolios
at the industry and firm levels. The product market competition is measured
using either the Herfindahl index (H-index) at the industry level, or the industry
adjusted price-cost margin (IPCM) at the firm level. For the industry level anal-
ysis, where industries are defined by three-digit SIC classification, all industries
are sorted yearly by the H-index into three competition portfolios. For the firm-
level analysis, all firms with the G- and E-index are sorted into three portfolios
yearly based on the firms’ IPCMs. IPCM-3YR is the three-year-moving-average
of IPCM for each firm. IPCM-1% and IPCM-5% are PCMs winsorized at 1%
and 5% levels. PCMs that are larger or lower than the boundaries are assigned to
the values of 99(95)% or 1(5)% in the PCM distribution. Each panel also reports
the difference of the average G- or E-index between low and high competition
portfolios. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
*Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
into three competition-sorted portfolios. For the industry level
analysis, we sort all industries yearly by the H-index and divide
them into three competition portfolios. We average G- or E-
index across all firms within an industry and assign the value to
this industry. Then, we pool all industries in the same portfolio
together across all years, and calculate the aggregate average of
the G- or E-index. The top (bottom) competition-sorted portfolio
is concentrated (competitive) industries.
Similarly, we group all firms that have a G- or E-index avail-
able into three competition portfolios according to their IPCM
value and rebalance the portfolios every year. We calculate the
average G- or E-index of firms in the IPCM-formed portfolios.
Firms in the portfolio with a high (low) IPCM value have a high
(low) market power.
Table 2 presents the relationship between the degree of prod-
uct market competition and the quality of corporate governance,
as well as t-statistics for the difference between two extreme
competition-formed portfolios. The results from this table pro-
vide an overall picture that strong competition is related to weak
corporate governance structures. In Panel A, the average G-
index associated with competitive industries is 9.38, which is
significantly higher than the average G-index of concentrated
industries (9.04). Low-IPCM firms also have a higher average
G-index (9.40) than high-IPCM firms (8.84) when we measure
competition by using the IPCM-3YR. The results using the other
two IPCM measures, IPCM-1% and IPCM-5%, are substantially
similar. Panel B shows that the results are robust when the E-
index is used as a proxy for corporate governance quality. The
average E-index (2.60) of competitive industries is higher than
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Table 3
Market competition, governance structures, and the level of ownership.
Ownership G-index E-index
Competition Index Low-High Competition Index Low-High
Low 2 High Mean t-Stat Low 2 High Mean t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
High 9.25 9.13 8.57 0.69 4.35** 2.34 2.42 2.12 0.22 2.73**
2 9.22 9.38 8.53 0.69 4.55** 2.40 2.47 2.19 0.22 2.67**
Low 9.40 9.19 8.84 0.56 3.62** 2.50 2.39 2.14 0.36 3.16**
High-Low −0.15 −0.06 −0.27 −0.16 0.04 −0.01
t-Stat −1.52 −0.36 −1.08 −3.41** 0.49 −0.09
Panel B: IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
High 9.31 9.22 8.85 0.46 5.48** 2.46 2.46 2.23 0.23 5.68**
2 9.50 9.57 8.75 0.75 8.98** 2.55 2.55 2.20 0.35 8.71**
Low 9.42 9.44 8.84 0.58 6.94** 2.41 2.41 2.08 0.33 7.99**
High-Low −0.10 −0.23 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.15
t-Stat −1.17 −2.68** 0.21 1.20 1.38 3.79**
Panel C: IPCM-1% formed portfolios
High 9.28 9.25 8.86 0.419 4.95** 2.45 2.47 2.23 0.22 5.31**
2 9.48 9.56 8.77 0.711 8.51** 2.54 2.54 2.22 0.32 7.98**
Low 9.38 9.47 8.85 0.532 6.38** 2.41 2.42 2.06 0.35 8.55**
High-Low −0.11 −0.22 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.17
t-Stat −1.23 −2.60** 0.07 0.91 1.06 4.42**
Panel D: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
High 9.24 9.32 8.82 0.42 4.99** 2.45 2.48 2.22 0.23 5.55**
2 9.37 9.71 8.79 0.58 6.96** 2.50 2.60 2.23 0.27 6.78**
Low 9.25 9.51 8.89 0.37 4.37** 2.39 2.46 2.04 0.35 8.35**
High-Low −0.02 −0.19 −0.07 0.06 0.03 0.18
t-Stat −0.19 −2.18** −0.87 1.36 0.69 4.45**
This table presents the average G- or E-index of competition portfolios for a given category of ownership (high, 2 or low). The ownership in each firm is measured
at the last quarter of the previous year by the largest institutional ownership. When the H-index is used as a competition measure, the ownership is equally weighted
at the industry level. Otherwise, ownership is measured at the firm level. All industries or firms in each competition portfolio of Table 2 are again sorted by largest
ownership into three ownership groups to form 3 × 3 = 9 portfolios yearly. The table also reports the difference of the average G-index (and E-index) between low
and high competition portfolios and between high and low ownership portfolios. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
*Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
the average E-index (2.35) of concentrated industries. When we
further assess competition at the firm level by using the three
IPCM measures, low-IPCM firms consistently show a higher
average E-index than high-IPCM firms. All differences between
portfolios of low and high competition indexes are statistically
significant at the 5% level.
Next, we investigate whether competition can substitute for
corporate governance from the viewpoint of shareholders. As
documented in the previous literature, larger shareholders have
incentives to monitor executives and have more power to vote
against management proposals that are detrimental to them
(see, e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gillan and Starks, 2003).
If the large shareholders perceive that competition offers an
inadequate disciplinary force, they may ensure the quality of
corporate governance by prohibiting management from increas-
ing the number of shareholder rights provisions. In this case,
we expect no significant difference in the average G- and E-
indexes between two extreme competition portfolios given the
same level of large institutional ownership. On the contrary, if
competition provides enough monitoring, the results of Table 2
should remain unchanged, even after controlling for the degree
of large shareholder ownership.
Cremers and Nair (2005) investigate how the market for cor-
porate control interacts with internal monitoring by using the
largest institutional ownership as a proxy for the degree of inter-
nal monitoring. We employ a similar methodology to measure
ownership in each firm for the last quarter of the previous year.
Within the same competition portfolio, all industries and firms
are split into three groups according to the ownership of the
largest institutional shareholder. We expect the average G- or E-
index of the low competition-index portfolio to be higher than
the high competition-index portfolio within the same level of
ownership.
Table 3 depicts average G- and E-indexes of competition-
ownership portfolios with varying competition measures. It also
contains differences of these average indexes, along with their
t-statistics, between low and high competition-sorted portfolios.
The results in Panel A are consistent with Table 2. In the high-
est ownership portfolio, competitive industries have an average
G-index of 9.25, compared with 8.57 for concentrated indus-
tries. For the medium or low ownership portfolio, the average
G-index of competitive industries is consistently higher than the
average G-index of concentrated industries. Using the E-index,
we again find that strong competition is associated with poor
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Table 4
Competition and corporate governance analysis at the industry level.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Intercept 10.76 14.82** 11.23 30.81** 3.21 10.84** 3.08 19.06**
H-index −0.38 −3.25** −0.36 −15.39** −0.12 −2.23** −0.10 −5.68**
Size 0.09 0.95 0.08 2.75** −0.06 −1.43 −0.04 −2.26**
Q −0.04 −2.10** −0.19 −5.67** −0.02 −3.33** −0.07 −4.06**
Volume 0.15 0.72 −1.40 −1.97* 0.14 2.81** 0.73 2.23**
Return −10.38 −2.72** −7.00 −2.57** −1.98 −1.13 −1.88 −1.22
ROA −0.09 −0.57 −0.80 −4.13** 0.04 0.56 0.03 0.37
SGROWTH −1.61 −4.21** −1.58 −8.89** −0.17 −1.06 −0.13 −1.16
YLD −0.04 −1.59 5.58 1.52 0.01 0.93 1.04 0.95
IO 2.45 3.05** 3.02 8.58** 0.60 1.57 0.47 3.42**
LargeO −10.90 −4.77** −10.78 −10.94** −3.00 −2.75** −2.36 −3.55**
Error clustered Industry NO Industry NO
Adj. R-square 0.10 NA 0.06 NA
Observations 3783 16 3729 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the industry level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the average G- and E-index at the industry level. The competition index, H-index, is the Herfindahl index. Every year, industries
are grouped into three competition portfolios according to their competition index by using COMPUSTAT information in previous year. Competitive industries are
assigned value 0. Concentrated industries are assigned value 2. Other industries are assigned value 1. These portfolio values are used to substitute competition index to
run regressions. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models (3) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value
measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value of assets, where market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets + market
value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred taxes); volume is the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding
prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years prior to the fiscal end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total
assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD is the dividend yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is
total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured at December of year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm
at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at the industry level. The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which
contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT industrial annual file from 1990 to 2005.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
corporate governance at various levels of the largest ownership.
All differences are statistically significant at conventional levels.
Panels B, C, and D report the results using IPCM for the
firm-level analysis to measure competition. In each of the three
ownership categories, low-IPCM firms in general have a higher
average G-index than high-IPCM firms. For example, the aver-
age G-indexes for firms with low IPCM and high ownership are
9.31 in Panel B, 9.28 in Panel C, and 9.24 in Panel D, which
are all higher than their counterparts with high IPCM and in the
high ownership category. When we continue to use the E-index
as a proxy for corporate governance, low-IPCM firms still have a
higher average E-index at various levels of ownership. All aver-
age G- and E-index differences between portfolios with low and
high IPCM are statistically significant at the 5% level. The find-
ings suggest that if a firm faces strong competition, institutional
investors will not use their voting power to improve shareholder
rights.
There is weak evidence that large institutional investors pre-
fer better corporate governance. Across different H-index levels,
firms with a high institutional ownership in general have a low
G-index. The same pattern also exists when using the E-index
as a proxy for corporate governance. Based on IPCM as a mea-
sure of competition, the results show some evidence that the
large institutional shareholders are concerned about corporate
governance. In Panel B, the average G-indexes for low- and
medium-IPCM firms at the high level of ownership are 9.31,
and 9.22, which are lower than the averages of G-index for the
corresponding firms in other categories of ownership. However,
no similar patterns are observed when the E-index is used as a
proxy for the quality of corporate governance.
In summary, we show that strong competition is associated
with poor quality corporate governance and that the fear of liq-
uidation may be the primary force that disciplines management.
It is plausible that poor corporate governance is caused by indus-
try characteristics other than product market competition, such
as customer relationships (e.g., Cremers et al., 2008). However,
our overall evidence at the firm and industry levels would sug-
gest that competition does play a role in the quality of corporate
governance. Thus, we interpret that our results are more likely
to reflect the competition effect, consistent with our prediction
that competition can be an option for governance mechanisms
and a substitute for traditional corporate governance structures.
4.2. Competition, ﬁrm characteristics, and corporate
governance
Gompers et al. (2003) find that firms with weak shareholder
rights tend to be large, and have low sales growth, poor perfor-
mance, low firm value, and high institutional ownership. Many
researchers believe that there is a strong connection between the
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Table 5
Firm-level Herfindahl index and corporate governance.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Intercept 8.06 21.14** 8.14 42.52** 2.74 15.52** 2.56 41.23**
H-index −0.11 −0.98 −0.12 −3.46** −0.06 −1.16 −0.07 −5.25**
Size 0.25 5.31** 0.22 14.8** −0.02 −0.84 −0.03 −7.26**
Q −0.19 −4.67** −0.16 −9.97** −0.11 −5.69** −0.11 −10.43**
Volume −2.29 −5.16** −1.89 −6.66** −1.19 −5.56** −1.45 −6.94**
Return −10.04 −3.58** −8.88 −4.13** −2.36 −1.78* −1.06 −0.88
ROA −0.99 −2.07** −1.29 −4.08** 0.05 0.23 0.13 1.37
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.12** −0.72 −10.04** −0.13 −1.60 −0.14 −6.69**
YLD 1.70 2.80** 11.92 3.55** 0.80 2.74** 5.01 3.54**
IO 1.60 5.21** 2.06 7.71** 0.77 5.09** 0.95 9.54**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.05 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17975 16 17641 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the firm level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of an individual firm. Competition index, H-index, is the Herfindahl index at the industry level. Each year
industries are grouped into three competition groups according to their H-index. The competitive portfolio of firms is assigned to value 0, the concentrated portfolio
of firms is assigned to value 2, and portfolio of firms between competitive and concentrated is assigned to value 1. These values are used to substitute competition
index and assigned to firms under the same competition portfolio to run regressions. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models (3) and (4) are
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value of assets, where
market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets+market value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred taxes); volume is
the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years prior to the fiscal
end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD is the dividend
yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured at December of
year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at the industry level.
The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT industrial annual
file from 1990 to 2005.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
quality of corporate governance and firm value and that various
firm characteristics also affect corporate governance. The results
in Table 1 show a potential relationship between strong competi-
tion and low firm value. A question arises is whether the effect of
competition on corporate governance are actually caused by firm
value and other firm characteristics. To assess the robustness of
the effect of competition on the quality of corporate governance,
we regress the G- or E-index on the measures of competition and
control for the factors mentioned above, including firm value,
as follows:
G-index (E-index)i = α0 + β1Qi + β2H-index (IPCM)i
+β3Sizei + β4Volumei + β5Returni
+β6ROAi + β7SGROWTHi
+β8YLDi + β9IOi + β10LargeOi,
where the control variables are firm value, competition mea-
sures, firm size, trading volume, stock performance, operating
performance, sales growth, dividend yield, institutional own-
ership, and largest shareholder. A detailed description of the
control variables is contained in the data section.
Table 4 shows the regression results of the above model, with
t-statistics computed based on clustered standard errors at the
firm level. Models (1) and (3) are estimated using fixed effects
regressions, whereas Models (2) and (4) are based on the Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regression. Our overall results confirm
a negative link between the H-index and governance quality
measured by both G- and E-indexes. While the findings suggest
that a higher firm value is related to better corporate governance,
with the coefficients of firm value being negative and statistically
significant, Models (1)–(4) show that increasing competition is
associated with weak shareholder rights, even after controlling
for effect of firm value. Other firm performance measures, such
as ROA, return, and sales growth, bear a negative sign in the
regressions, but they are not robustly significant and do not affect
the observed relation between competition and governance.
Table 5 shows the results of firm-level pooled fixed effect
regressions with t-statistics corrected for clustered standard
errors and of firm-level Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regres-
sions. Unlike Table 4, Table 5 excludes the largest institutional
ownership from the regression because it is highly correlated
with overall institutional ownership.9 Again, we find a robust
negative association between the H-index and corporate gov-
ernance. The coefficient of firm value remains statistically
9 The correlation between the largest ownership and overall ownership in our
sample is 0.72, inducing a collinearity problem in the estimation. Cremers and
Nair (2005) also document that there is a high correlation (88%) between the
total blockholdings and largest blockholding.
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Table 6
Firm-level market power and corporate governance.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.08 21.72** 7.51 38.82** 2.68 15.37** 2.51 38.25**
IPCM −0.12 −1.75* −0.13 −4.59** −0.08 −2.46** −0.05 −3.18**
Size 0.29 6.07** 0.22 15.47** −0.01 −0.65 −0.03 −6.28**
Q −0.20 −5.12** −0.18 −9.08** −0.10 −5.42** −0.11 −9.38**
Volume −2.21 −4.96** −2.41 −8.96** −1.08 −5.03** −1.32 −6.64**
Return −9.76 −3.65** −10.01 −6.25** −2.47 −1.86* −1.22 −1.02
ROA −0.60 −1.26 −0.39 −1.18 0.18 0.81 0.22 2.10*
SGROWTH −0.70 −4.06** −0.06 −3.19** −0.10 −1.18 −0.11 −5.09**
YLD 1.56 2.93** 10.84 3.38** 0.77 2.83** 4.87 3.42**
IO 1.40 4.61** 2.01 7.40** 0.77 5.09** 0.95 9.73**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
Panel B: IPCM-3YR formed portfolios
Intercept 8.13 21.96** 7.55 38.11** 2.71 15.53** 2.54 38.01**
IPCM −0.12 −1.82* −0.11 −3.13** −0.06 −2.19** −0.04 −2.20**
Size 0.28 6.04** 0.22 14.90** −0.02 −0.72 −0.03 −6.69**
Q −0.20 −4.99** −0.18 −8.86** −0.10 −5.34** −0.11 −9.08**
Volume −2.17 −4.87** −2.35 −7.84** −1.07 −4.98** −1.30 −6.55**
Return −9.71 −3.63** −10.03 −6.30** −2.43 −1.83* −1.16 −0.99
ROA −0.80 −1.71* −0.56 −1.80* 0.06 0.25 0.13 1.43
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.15** −0.06 −3.25** −0.11 −1.31 −0.12 −5.61**
YLD 1.57 2.92** 11.04 3.36** 0.78 2.81** 4.94 3.46**
IO 1.38 4.57** 2.00 7.30** 0.76 5.03** 0.94 9.61**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.04 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
Panel C: IPCM-1% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.13 21.92** 7.54 38.36** 2.71 15.5** 2.53 38.04**
IPCM −0.11 −1.69* −0.11 −3.24** −0.07 −2.21** −0.05 −2.73**
Size 0.28 6.04** 0.22 14.97** −0.02 −0.71 −0.03 −6.58**
Q −0.20 −5.02** −0.18 −8.98** −0.10 −5.34** −0.11 −9.28**
Volume −2.19 −4.9** −2.38 −8.07** −1.07 −4.97** −1.30 −6.65**
Return −9.77 −3.64** −10.05 −6.27** −2.46 −1.86* −1.22 −1.04
ROA −0.75 −1.61 −0.53 −1.66 0.09 0.39 0.15 1.54
SGROWTH −0.71 −4.16** −0.06 −3.24** −0.11 −1.31 −0.12 −5.64**
YLD 1.57 2.92** 11.04 3.37** 0.78 2.82** 4.95 3.46**
IO 1.39 4.58** 2.00 7.34** 0.76 5.05** 0.94 9.67**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
This table shows regressions results using two different approaches: (i) fixed effects regression with errors clustered at the firm level, and (ii) the Fama-MacBeth
method. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of individual firm. The competition index, IPCM, is the industry adjusted price-cost margin, where industries
are defined by using three-digit SIC classification. Firms are classified into three competition groups according to their values of IPCM each year. Firms with a high
IPCM are assigned to value 2, firms with a low IPCM are assigned to value 0, and firms between high and low IPCM are assigned to value 1. These values are used
to substitute competition index and assigned to firms under the same portfolio to run regression. Models (1) and (2) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models
(3) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Size is log of equity value measured in millions; Q is the ratio of market value of assets and book value
of assets, where market value of assets is calculated by (book value of assets + market value of common stock-book value of common stock-balance sheet deferred
taxes); volume is the 5-year-trading volume divided by the number of shares outstanding prior to the fiscal end; return is the monthly average return over 5 years
prior to the fiscal end; ROA is the operating income before depreciation divided by total assets; SGROWTH is the average growth of sales over five fiscal years; YLD
is the dividend yield which is dividend-to-share price ratio at the fiscal year end; IO is total institutional ownership in percent from Thomson financials measured
at December of year t− 1; LargeOWN is the largest institutional ownership in the firm at December of year t− 1. All variables are equal-weighted averages at
the industry level. The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ-listed securities which contain stock information in CRSP, sales information in COMPUSTAT
industrial annual file from 1990 to 2005.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
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significant and negative, implying that firms with higher firm
value have stronger shareholder rights.
We next explore whether competition affects the choice of
corporate governance by running regressions at the firm level
and by using IPCM as a proxy for competition. Table 6 shows
the results by using G-index as a corporate governance measure
and three different IPCMs as an intensity index of competition.
We first report the results by using IPCM-5% because it is the
most conservative measure for competition at the firm level.10
In order to confirm our findings, we further present results with
IPCM-1% and IPCM-3YR as competition measures in Panels B
and C. In Panel A, the coefficients of the fixed effect regression
and Fama-MacBeth regression on IPCM are −0.12 and −0.13,
and they are negative and significant at the 10% and 5% levels,
respectively. The coefficients of IPCM in Panel B and Panel C
are again negative. These consistent findings corroborate our
conclusion that competition has a negative effect on corporate
governance. Thus, when competition is strong, the quality of a
firm’s corporate governance is lower.
The firm level results are robust when the E-index is employed
as the proxy for the quality of corporate governance. IPCM
remains negatively associated with the E-index in Panels A, B
and C, suggesting that greater market competition is related to
poor governance structures. Stock return, ROA, and sales growth
have a weak correlation with the E-index. The overall results
provide reinforcing evidence that competition has a significant
impact on corporate governance after controlling for the effects
of various firm characteristics.
4.3. Endogeneity of ﬁrm value and corporate governance
Recent studies have shown that firm value and corporate
governance mechanisms are simultaneously determined (Palia,
2001; Durnev and Kim, 2005; Brick et al., 2005). Lehn et al.
(2007) further provide evidence to show that low firm value
actually causes poor corporate governance practices. Although
the empirical evidence has been inconclusive, firm value and
corporate governance are likely to affect each other. Firms that
have a stronger ability to compete in the product market tend
to higher value or better performance. These better perform-
ing firms could in turn have strong shareholder rights. On the
other hand, strong corporate governance improves incentives for
management and the efficiency of operations. As a result, good
corporate governance may be associated with high firm value or
good competition performance.
To address the endogeneity issue, we estimate the relations
between competition, firm value, and corporate governance
using a system of simultaneous equations with a three-stage
least squares (3SLS) methodology. For the regression, we need
to identify the instrumental variables that are related to corporate
governance or firm value only, but identifying the suitable instru-
mental variables is difficult. Following the existing literature, we
10 There are some extreme outliers when we calculate PCM for each firm.
These outliers affect the average of PCM for an industry. Therefore, the value
of IPCM for a firm may vary with different treatments of outliers.
use a three-year-lagged Tobin’s Q to substitute for firm value
and then re-estimate the previous results. The three-year-lagged
firm value is highly correlated with the current firm value; how-
ever, it is unlikely for the current corporate governance to affect
the three-year-lagged firm value.11 Thus, the results obtained
using the three-year-lagged firm value in the 3SLS estimation
offer additional evidence on the relationship between corporate
governance and competition.
Table 7 shows the results of 3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-
sectional regressions of governance indexes on competition
measures and control variables. For each year, we run one 3SLS
regression to obtain the coefficient estimate of each variable. The
final coefficients for the model are the distributions of each coef-
ficient for the years from 1990 through 2005. We use the total
institutional and the largest ownership as instrumental variables
for the G- or E-index. The reason is that institutional investors
and large shareholders are shown to be related to the quality of
corporate governance (Gillan and Starks, 2003). Additionally,
in our sample, the correlation between institutional ownership
and firm value is low, and the correlation between ownership
and the G- or E-index is high, suggesting that institutional and
largest ownerships are two valid instrumental variables for the
G- or E-index.
To find instrumental variables for firm value, we adopt the
methodology of Palia (2001), who uses treasury stock (treasury),
R&D ratio (R&D), and advertising expense (Adv) as instru-
mental variables for firm value. Treasury stock is the ratio of
treasury stock to book value of assets, R&D ratio is the research
and development expenditure divided by sales, and advertis-
ing expense is the ratio of advertising expenses to book value
of assets. Higher values of R&D and Adv represent greater
opportunities for future growth, which is unlikely related to the
quality of corporate governance. The ratio of treasury stock is
supposed to be positively correlated with firm value.12 Since
COMPUSTAT has some missing values for R&D and Adv,
we add dummies for the firms that do not have values for
these two variables. This prevents us from losing too many
observations.
Panel A of Table 7 uses the H-index as a measure for competi-
tion, whereas Panel B employs the IPCM winsorized at 5%. The
dependent variable is a firm’s G- or E-index for Models (1) and
(3), and is firm value in Models (2) and (4). The panels show cor-
roborating evidence that strong competition and low firm value
are related to a high G- or E-index. The effect of competition on
the quality of corporate governance is not caused by firm value.
The coefficients of Tobin’s Q and the H-index are consistently
negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, firms with
better stock performance or operating performance have better
governance structures and higher firm value. The coefficients of
return, ROA, and sales growth are significantly negative, indicat-
ing that weak firm performance is associated with poor corporate
11 Lehn et al. (2007) provide evidence to show that firm value lagged up to 20
years is still significantly associated with the current firm value.
12 For a more detailed explanation of these three instrumental variables, see
Palia (2001).
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Table 7
3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of the governance index on competition measures.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Intercept 8.44 47.51** 0.88 6.50** 3.03 18.63** 0.52 4.52**
Q −0.12 −2.15** −0.23 −3.73**
Gov. Index −0.14 −14.10** −0.31 −13.63**
H-index −0.12 −2.85** 0.08 5.45** −0.10 −5.20** 0.07 4.69**
Size 0.16 10.18** 0.14 8.55** −0.06 −2.55** 0.10 6.46**
Volume −2.47 −7.88** −0.14 −0.72 0.71 1.92* −0.34 −1.69
Return −9.13 −3.70** 20.41 8.12** −2.56 −1.35 21.56 8.28**
ROA −1.48 −3.67** 4.71 22.25** 0.23 0.88 4.86 22.86**
SGROWTH −0.63 −8.69** 0.02 0.37 −0.10 −0.81 0.06 1.70
YLD 12.12 3.47** −1.63 −2.13** 1.42 1.16 −1.93 −2.82**
IO 3.00 13.49** 0.47 2.71**
LargeO −5.04 −13.41** −1.83 −12.17**
Treasury 0.82 10.75** 0.78 10.48**
R&D 7.07 8.16** 6.93 7.81**
Adv 1.41 4.83** 1.36 4.71**
R&DDum 0.05 2.02* 0.05 2.50**
ADVDum 0.00 −0.16 0.00 −0.16
Panel B: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.50 49.59** 0.96 6.79** 2.71 49.99** 0.54 4.68**
Q −0.22 −2.47** −0.19 −3.35**
Gov. Index −0.15 −13.98** −0.30 −12.93**
IPCM −0.09 −2.49** 0.00 0.36 −0.06 −3.22** 0.00 −0.17
Size 0.19 13.54** 0.14 8.34** −0.06 −8.25** 0.10 6.26**
Volume −2.47 −7.34** −0.22 −1.06 −1.54 −7.36** −0.34 −1.67
Return −8.51 −3.00** 20.78 8.11** 0.12 0.08 21.60 8.33**
ROA −1.09 −2.67** 4.72 21.86** 0.47 1.81* 4.91 22.57**
SGROWTH −0.63 −7.39** −0.02 −0.34 −0.06 −2.48** 0.05 1.24
YLD 10.87 3.40** −1.55 −2.18** 4.61 3.19** −1.94 −2.78**
IO 2.77 12.98** 1.42 17.30**
LargeO −4.97 −12.29** −2.63 −16.78**
Treasury 0.81 10.72** 0.80 10.84**
R&D 6.96 8.01** 6.87 7.72**
Adv 1.36 4.55** 1.36 4.54**
R&DDum 0.06 2.40** 0.06 2.57**
ADVDum −0.01 −0.38 −0.01 −0.31
This table shows results of 3SLS Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions at the firm level. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index of an individual firm. The
H-index is the Herfindahl index at the industry level, while IPCM is the industry adjusted price-cost margin of the firm with three-digit SIC industry classification.
Firms are grouped into three competition portfolios according to their values of IPCM each year. Firms in the high IPCM portfolio are assigned to value 2, firms in
the low IPCM portfolio are assigned to value 0, and firms between high and low IPCM are assigned to value 1. Industries are also independently sorted into three
competition portfolios according to their values of H-index each year. Firms are assigned a value 0, 1, or 2 with respect to the degree of competition in the industry.
Portfolio of firms with a low H-index is assigned a value 0, portfolio of firms with a high H-index is assigned a value 2. In Panels A and B, we use the competition
indicator based on the H-index and IPCM, respectively. For each year, we use 3SLS to estimate the following simultaneous equations:
G-index (E-index)i = α1,0 + γ1,1Qi + β1,1H-index (IPCM)i + β1,2Sizei + β1,3Volumei + β1,4Returni + β1,5ROAi + β1,6SGROWTHi + β1,7YLDi
+β1,8IOi + β1,9LargeOi
Qi = α2,0 + γ2,1G-index (E-index)i + β2,1H-index (IPCM)i + β2,2Sizei + β2,3Volumei + β2,4Returni + β2,5ROAi + β2,6SGROWTHi
+β2,7YLDi + β2,8Treasuryi + β2,9R&Di + β2,10Advi + β2,11R&DDumi + β2,12ADVDumi,
where competition is either the H-index or IPCM, and the governance index is either G- or E-index. The final coefficients are the average of 3SLS regression results
year by year. In the first equation, total institutional ownership and largest institutional ownership are used as instrumental variables to proxy the G- or E-index. In
the second equation, Treasury, R&D, Advertisement, R&D dummy, and Advertisement dummy are used as instrumental variables to proxy firm value. Treasury is
the ratio of treasury stock to book value. R&D is the research and development expenses. Adv is the ratio of advertising expenses to book value. R&DDum and
ADVDum are dummies set to 1 for firms that do not have reported values on R&D expenses and advertising expenses. The dependent variables of Models (1) and
(3) are governance indexes of each firm. The dependent variables of the Models (2) and (4) are individual firm value. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
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Table 8
Effect of firm-level competition on corporate governance with three-year lagged Tobin’s Q as firm value.
Variable G-index E-index
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat Coef. t-Stat
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Intercept 8.03 20.94** 8.17 44.40** 2.70 15.26** 2.55 43.35**
H-index −0.11 −0.97 −0.11 −2.77** −0.06 −1.10 −0.07 −4.28**
Size 0.23 4.92** 0.21 14.30** −0.03 −1.49 −0.04 −8.87**
Q3 −0.05 −2.42** −0.17 −6.66** −0.04 −3.51** −0.09 −8.07**
Volume −2.29 −4.83** −1.49 −5.36** −1.13 −5.02** −1.27 −6.03**
Return −14.38 −5.47** −11.99 −5.86** −4.84 −3.91** −3.28 −3.02**
ROA −1.46 −3.06** −1.12 −4.90** −0.19 −0.82 0.08 0.96
SGROWTH −0.64 −3.63** −0.64 −10.43** −0.07 −0.87 −0.08 −3.30**
YLD 1.78 2.78** 11.89 3.45** 0.84 2.67** 5.13 3.48**
IO 1.61 5.21** 1.98 8.04** 0.77 5.06** 0.93 9.75**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.06 NA 0.04 NA
Observations 17975 16 17641 16
Panel B: IPCM-5% formed portfolios
Intercept 8.03 21.43** 7.67 44.96** 2.64 15.09** 2.50 40.47**
IPCM −0.14 −2.06** −0.10 −3.58** −0.09 −2.73** −0.05 −3.10**
Size 0.26 5.62** 0.22 15.31** −0.03 −1.26 −0.04 −7.89**
Q3 −0.05 −2.44** −0.20 −7.06** −0.04 −3.42** −0.09 −7.72**
Volume −2.20 −4.63** −1.75 −6.78** −1.01 −4.49** −1.16 −5.80**
Return −14.74 −5.86** −14.97 −7.37** −4.84 −3.91** −3.42 −3.26**
ROA −1.08 −2.29** −0.33 −1.62 −0.02 −0.09 0.17 1.69
SGROWTH −0.61 −3.47** −0.08 −3.88** −0.04 −0.45 −0.05 −2.35**
YLD 1.64 2.91** 10.72 3.34** 0.81 2.77** 4.99 3.38**
IO 1.43 4.67** 1.89 7.37** 0.78 5.07** 0.93 9.97**
Error clustered Firm NO Firm NO
R-Square 0.07 NA 0.05 NA
Observations 17769 16 17638 16
This table replicates results of Tables 5 and 6 with three-year lagged Tobin’s Q as firm value. The dependent variable is the G- or E-index for each firm. All variables
are at the firm level. See Tables 5 and 6 for the description of control variables and competition measures. Panel A shows the results replicating Table 5. Panel B
shows the results of replicating Table 6 with IPCM-5% as a measure of product market competition. Models (1) and (3) are fixed effect regressions, whereas Models
(2) and (4) are Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005.
*Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
governance. Firms with poor governance structures are large in
size and have higher institutional ownership.
As we discussed earlier, a potential concern about 3SLS
regressions is the problem of choosing the appropriate instru-
mental variables. To complete the analysis, we rerun the
regressions in Tables 5 and 6, and substitute three-year-lagged
Tobin’sQ for the firm value. If competition does have an effect on
the quality of corporate governance, and this effect is not driven
by firm value, we expect the results to be consistent with the evi-
dence that we have documented. This approach helps mitigate
the problem of determining the suitable instrumental variables.
Table 8 replicates the results of Tables 5 and 6 using a three-
year-lagged Tobin’s Q for firm value. The evidence at both the
industry and firm levels confirms our findings that firms fac-
ing strong competition from other companies are inclined to
have poor governance structures. The coefficients of compe-
tition measures and firm values are negative and statistically
significant. Firm performance is also negatively related to the G-
or E-index. The results based on the three-year-lagged Tobin’s
Q are consistent with those based on 3SLS regressions. Over-
all, the results show that the trade-off between competition and
corporate governance is robust.
5. Performance analysis
Thus far, we find convincing evidence that competition has a
direct impact on corporate governance. Specifically, competition
acts like a governance mechanism and can substitute for con-
ventional corporate governance structures. One key argument
that Allen and Gale (2000) have made is that agency problems
have been exaggerated in the previous literature. They assert
that managers naturally tend to work hard and efficiently for
their companies. If competition is strong enough, conventional
governance mechanisms are no longer needed because most
mechanisms are designed to relieve the problem of agency costs.
It is, therefore, essential that we test whether good corporate gov-
ernance can still add value to firms, or if competition alone is
enough to discipline management.
This section implements Cremers and Nair’s (2005) method-
ology to explore the link between competition and corporate
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Table 9
Competition, corporate governance, and abnormal returns.
Governance G-index E-index
Low 2 High Low 2 High
Panel A: H-index formed portfolios
Good 0.87% 0.57% 0.73% 0.92% 0.44% 0.67%
2 0.88% 0.73% 0.31% 0.73% 0.52% 0.42%
Poor 0.64% 0.45% −0.23% 0.64% 0.60% 0.15%
Diff(Good,Poor) 0.23% 0.12% 0.95% 0.28% −0.16% 0.52%
t-Stat 1.35 0.42 1.82* 1.06 −0.45 1.50
Panel B: IPCM formed portfolios
Good 0.68% 0.42% 1.09% 0.50% 0.48% 1.34%
2 0.52% 0.51% 1.18% 0.54% 0.46% 0.92%
Poor 0.66% 0.32% 0.64% 0.54% 0.56% 0.33%
Diff(Good,Poor) 0.02% 0.10% 0.45% −0.04% −0.08% 1.01%
t-Stat 0.10 0.43 1.57 −0.15 −0.31 2.91**
This table reports monthly abnormal returns of nine portfolios (3 × 3) which are formed on Herfindahl index (H-index) or IPCM and corporate governance index as
well as Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolios. Each year, all industries are sorted into 3 portfolios according the H-index or IPCM. Firms in the same competition
portfolio are divided into three governance portfolios whose G-index (E-index) is above or equal to 13 (5), between 12 and 7 (4 and 1), and below or equal to 6 (0),
respectively. Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolio buys good governance portfolio and sell poor governance portfolio stocks. Low H-index (IPCM) portfolio and
high H-index (IPCM) portfolio indicate competitive and concentrated industries. The abnormal return is calculated by using monthly value-weighted excess return
in each portfolio and Diff(Good,Poor) governance portfolio. The sample period is from 1990 to 2005, and the abnormal returns are estimated by using the following
four-factor model.
Rt = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + εt,
where Rt is the excess return for the portfolio at month t. MKTt, SMBt, HMLt, and MOMt are the monthly return on the market portfolio, small minus big portfolio,
high minus low portfolio, and momentum portfolio. α is the abnormal return.
* Significance at the 10% level.
** Significance at the 5% level.
governance. If competition can substitute for corporate gover-
nance structures when the market competition is stiff, one would
expect no significant difference in abnormal returns between
portfolios of companies with strong and weak shareholder rights.
We therefore examine the abnormal return of a strategy that
longs on stocks of firms with good governance practices and
shorts on stocks of firms with poor governance practices for a
given competition intensity level.
For each year, all industries are sorted into three competition
portfolios according to the H-index or IPCM. Firms in the same
competition portfolio are further divided into three categories
based on their governance ratings with the G-index (E-index)
above or equal to 13 (5), between 12 and 7 (4 and 1), and below
or equal to 6 (0).13 The abnormal returns are estimated by using
monthly value-weighted excess returns in each portfolio and the
following four-factor model,
Rt = α + β1MKTt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4MOMt + εt,
where Rt is the value-weighted excess return for a portfolio at
month t. MKTt, SMBt, HMLt and MOMt are the returns on the
market portfolio, the small minus big portfolio, the high minus
13 Cremers and Nair (2005) relax the cutoff of the G-index for good corporate
governance from G-index ≤ 5 to G-index ≤ 6 and for poor corporate governance
from G-index ≥ 14 to G-index ≥ 13. This ensures that there are enough samples
in each portfolio.
low book-to-market portfolio, and the momentum portfolio. α
is the abnormal return.
Panels A and B of Table 9 report monthly abnormal returns
for each portfolio as well as Diff(Good,Poor) by using the
H-index and IPCM, respectively, as proxies for competition.
Diff(Good,Poor) is the difference between a good governance
portfolio and a poor governance portfolio. Results indicate that
when competition is stiff, the quality of corporate governance
does not have a significant effect on performance. In highly
competitive environments as measured by the H-index or IPCM,
well-governed firms perform no significantly better than poorly
governed firms. Their Diff(Good,Poor) is between 0.23% and
0.28% in Panel A and between −0.04% and 0.02% in Panel B.
Conversely, we find some evidence in concentrated industries
that firms with good governance earn significantly larger abnor-
mal returns than their counterparts with poor governance. Using
the H-index as the competition measure, good and poor G-index
governance portfolios generate abnormal returns of 0.73% and
−0.23%, and the difference is statistically significant at the 10%
level. Similarly, using IPCM, the difference in portfolios of firms
with low and high E-index governance ratings is 1.01%, and is
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. This finding
is consistent with that of Hou and Robinson (2006), who find
competitive industries, measured by using the H-index, having
higher returns than concentrated industries.
In summary, product market competition can serve as an
external governance mechanism to discipline management.
When competition is tough enough to discipline management,
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the quality of corporate governance does not add value to firm
performance. Competition, to some extent, could be a substitute
for corporate governance. Hence, our findings suggest that the
previous literature might have overstated the agency problem.
6. Conclusion
This study provides empirical evidence that product market
competition can be a governance mechanism. Specifically, we
take the view of Allen and Gale (2000) that competition plays
the role of takeovers. Firms with stronger management take con-
trol of the product market, and leave a much smaller share of
the market for loser firms. Therefore, competition helps reveal
the best management team and discipline the management with
weaker performance. We investigate whether and how the nature
of product market competition acts as an external disciplinary
mechanism for corporate management and whether competi-
tion can be a substitute for corporate governance. Moreover, we
examine whether the fear of liquidation is the driving force that
induces firm managers to work harder.
To explore the link between product market competition and
corporate governance, we construct two different competition
indexes and conduct the test at the industry and firm levels. For
the industry level analysis, we implement the H-index to mea-
sure the degree of concentration, and for the firm level analysis,
we use IPCM to assess the market power of a firm and also to
measure its probability to be liquidated. We also rate the quality
of corporate governance with two different measures, G- and
E-indexes.
The results show that product market competition is nega-
tively related to corporate governance – strong competition is
associated with poor corporate governance. Our findings are
robust to the different competition measures employed, even
after controlling for firm value, firm size, stock returns, operat-
ing performance, and institutional ownership. The implication
is that competition does not affect corporate governance through
firm value or firm performance. To circumvent the possible
problem of endogeneity between corporate governance and firm
value, We also implement the three-stage least squares regres-
sions to reexamine the relationship between competition and
corporate governance. The link between strong product market
competition and poor corporate governance remains statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Finally, we find that well-governed firms earn no signifi-
cantly higher abnormal returns than poorly governed firms under
intense product market competition. However, good firms do
perform better than bad firms in a less competitive environment.
These findings not only suggest that agency problems may not
be as serious as what the previous literature has implied, but also
strengthen the importance of product market competition. The
overall evidence suggests that competition plays a substitute role
in corporate governance mechanisms.
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